MHQ Autumn 2013

MHQ is a fabulous military history magazine. It covers the gamut of the history of warfare, from the Bronze Age to the twenty-first century. Each issue is spectacular, a genuine work of art, and the authors are all top-notch.

I have had the privilege of working as a research editor for MHQ these last three years, and I wanted to share the pride that I have in the magazine with everyone else. Check it out when you have the chance. The latest issue contains a short piece, written by me, called the War List. It is about non-combat losses of naval vessels.

Marc DeSantis

Ancient Warfare Magazine – The Battle of Drepana, 249 BC

Readers of Consolidated Pop Culture will be well aware of how highly I regard Ancient Warfare magazine, a splendid English-language, Dutch-produced publication. For the last year or so, I have been writing review essays on various titles for the print magazine, but this month, my first article for Ancient Warfare, entitled The Battle of Drepana, 249 BC, has been published online in two parts.

You can read them both here and here.

Marc DeSantis

Next Up: Skynet!

Okay, perhaps Skynet is not just around the corner. That will take some doing. But the infamous, artificially-intelligent mastermind behind the Terminators just got one step closer with the launch of the naval UCAV X-47B from the deck of the aircraft carrier USS George H.W. Bush on May 14, 2013.  Eventually, major weapon systems will be autonomous, uninhabited machines, whether aerial, naval, or ground combat units. Right now, the major advantage of a human-crewed machine is the brain of the person inside it. Human warriors are much more adaptable and creative than machines, and can react faster and more appropriately to changing situations.
The future will be different. In time, the technical challenges posed by genuine artificial intelligence will be overcome, and an uncrewed vehicle will be as capable, or perhaps more capable, than a crewed craft. A significant portion of a modern fighter aircraft’s weight, for example, is taken up by the systems needed to allow the pilot to fly the warplane and to keep the pilot alive. If you can remove the human from inside the cockpit, you won’t even need a cockpit anymore, and can save a huge amount of weight, such as the ejection seat, which can be devoted to extra ordnance or fuel. That will be an enormous advantage over a piloted machine, assuming that all else, such as outright combat capability, are equal.

Marc DeSantis

F-35 Specifics

Although the troubled F-35 program has been reported on extensively in the past, it is not often that the mainstream press reports specific problems with the actual aircraft under development.  That is why the April 2013 issue of Popular Mechanics is noteworthy.  Joe Pappalardo has penned a short article about several development problems of the F-35B (that’s the Marine Corps version that can land vertically) and potential fixes for them.  Interestingly, and perhaps most worrisome, the maneuverability of the F-35B has been reduced from a sustained 5 g’s turn to 4.5.  There are other issues too, and I recommend that you check out this issue for them.  It seems that the decision to buy the aircraft while it is still in development has not proved to be a happy one.

Marc DeSantis

F-35 Lightning II Program Troubles

Time’s always awesome Battleland has just run a fantastic article by Mark Thompson about the endlessly troubled F-35 program. As you will recall, the F-35 Lighting II is intended to be a stealthy, multirole fighter for the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, and U.S Marine Corps. It is this attempt to be all things to (almost) all services that has held back the program, and perhaps even prevented the F-35 from ever becoming a useful fighter airplane.

Among other interesting tidbits of information in the article: The design blueprints for the aircraft are changed ten times every day of the week; the plane has a short range and the carriers it flies from will thus have to move dangerously close to enemy territory before they launch them; the 133,000 jobs currently tied to the F-35 program exist in no fewer forty-five of America’s states; the F-35 may not even outperform earlier aircraft in the U.S. arsenal, such as the F-15, F-16, or F-18, even though those planes are several decades older and less expensive; the bill for the projected 2,457 F-35’s to be procured by the U.S. will cost an eye-popping $396 billion, which is double the initial assessment when the program began; the three models of the F-35 now under development will be slower and less maneuverable than originally planned; the stealthy characteristics of the F-35, which have increased its costs and development problems, may not be of much use in evading air defenses after all in a world with better sensors and better computers; and the lifetime cost of maintaining the fleet of F-35’s is estimated be an astonishing $1.5 trillion.

After reading this article, which should be required reading for all American policymakers, I wonder if the United States has just spent a fortune developing the most advanced dirigible airship or sail-powered ship-of-the-line when the weapon type itself itself fading rapidly into obsolescence.

Marc DeSantis

F-35 Fighter Program Still in Trouble

The F-35 Lightning II program has been beset by a number of problems that were not anticipated when it was first proposed. It is astounding, even when considering the technological advancements that the F-35 represents, for a military aircraft program to require more than eleven years of development and not a single operational squadron yet exists.

If you have been reading this blog, you are well aware that one of the underlying reasons that America pays so much for its weapons is because the Pentagon seeks to push the tech envelope in every direction. Sometimes, this results in a remarkable weapon system, such as the M1 tank, while in others, the result is dubious (the V-22 Osprey) or both (the F-22).The F-35, which is shaping up to be the costliest weapon buy in American history, may never be the cost-effective, multi-service jet that was promised. It was meant to be a fighter usable by the US Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines, as well as a number of other countries. The problem is that Lockheed had to design a fighter that was stealthy, like the F-22, could dogfight, drop bombs, carry its weapons internally to keep it stealthy, and, oh yeah, land on a carrier by hovering, just like the old Harrier jump jet.

Getting all of these opposing design requirements to work in a single package, at a reasonable cost, no less, has proven far more difficult than expected. The F-35, which appears to have a distressingly short unrefueled range, reminds me of a latter-day F-111 Aardvark, a swing-wing jet of the 1960’s that, as a cost-saving measure, was supposed to be used by both the Navy and the Air Force. As it turned out the F-111 proved to be too heavy to land on carriers (oops!) and the Air Force was stuck with it. Irony of ironies, this big and heavy “fighter” was actually used in the light bomber role by the Air Force, which demonstrates that trying to be all things to all people usually means that you are nothing to everyone.

At this stage, it seems likely that the F-35 will never live up to the hopes expressed upon the inception of its plan, but it is too far along to give up, both politically and economically. Something will have to be salvaged from this otherwise unhappy fighter program. Look for far fewer purchases than anticipated, as newer and better Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV’s) emerge from the drawing boards of aerospace companies.  UAV’s are not yet the Dreadnought battleship that renders all previous designs obsolete, but they are getting close. Read about the sorry details of the F-35 here.

China’s Carrier Fighter – First Landing

The naval situation in East Asia has just gotten more interesting.  China has just achieved its first carrier jet landing on the recently-commissioned Liaoning.  Take a look at a photograph of the Shenyang J-15 here.

The Pentagon has not been impressed, but I think that it is watching China’s single aircraft carrier (for now) very closely. Something tells me that China’s growing naval power will be used to justify big American defense budgets for many years to come.

In the meanwhile, Japan is eyeing China’s build-up nervously.  It is responding with some moves of its own.

Marc DeSantis

The Weapons We Need

Check out this article by Robert Haddick in Foreign Policy. Stealth technology may now be in doubt because of more advanced radars and computers, and so the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert, favors larger ships and aircraft that can be adapted more easily because of their size. There is historical precedent for bigger weapons being easier to upgrade. The Royal Navy’s large Queen Elizabeth-class dreadnoughts were modernized between the world wars and remained first-class warships in the Second World War, but the smaller Royal Sovereign-class could not be refitted so easily, and were not as useful.

Make sure to take a look at the article itself by Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert mentioned in the Foreign Policy piece. Greenert makes some interesting points. He is also a supporter of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), which has been discussed at some length in previous posts on this site. I think that the idea of modularity is a very good one, but it is not a panacea. A weapon system, such as an aircraft, that can be employed in a wide variety of roles is fantastic, as long as it does well in all of those roles. A good example is the de Havilland Mosquito from the Second World War. The Mosquito turned out to be one of the best aircraft ever made, and was superb in all the missions given to it by the Royal Air Force.

A mediocre machine, by contrast, one that performed its multiple missions in only an acceptable fashion, would not be of much use, since what you really want is a warplane that is great in at least one area, such as dogfighting or dive bombing or reconnaissance. I think that the LCS, while fine in concept, may prove to be an all-around mediocre ship that does not stand out in any area. That is not a true cost-saving, since the Navy would have, in effect, purchased a sub-standard vessel that does not compare well with other, more narrowly-focused warships. The point made by Admiral Greenert is, however, well-taken. With the pace of technological change, every warplane, ship, or tank deployed by the U.S. armed forces must be capable of being upgraded over an extended period of time to keep it competitive.

 

Marc De Santis

Roosevelt’s Navy Book Review

ROOSEVELT’S NAVY: The Education of a Warrior President, 1882-1920

James Tertius de Kay

Pegasus Books

292 pages

2012

ISBN 978-1-60598-285-4

 

Franklin Delano Roosevelt served as Assistant Secretary of the Navy from 1913 to 1920, a position tasked with overseeing the $143 million budget of the world’s third largest navy, representing 20% of annual federal spending.
Roosevelt faced a daunting task. The core of the fleet was still comprised mainly of obsolete battleships of limited use. Germany was busily increasing the size of its navy with modern ships, and Japan, the victor in the recent Russo-Japanese War, was casting covetous glances across the Pacific. Thirteen of the Navy’s battleships, Roosevelt would claim, were unfit for operations because Congress had not authorized sufficient manpower to crew them.
The outbreak of the First World War in Europe cast naval policy in an important light, and Roosevelt, a staunch supporter of Britain, was realistic about how the war would impact America. Roosevelt was a proponent of preparedness, and helped to shepherd through Congress the 1916 Navy Bill, a $600 million outlay representing the biggest single expenditure on naval armament in history.
FDR proved to be a savvy operator. When American shipowners requested guns to protect their vessels from German U-boats, they were prevented from purchasing the weapons from the Navy because of the determined opposition of anti-war senators. Roosevelt hit upon a clever solution – the Navy would simply “loan” the guns needed, thereby not requiring congressional approval since they were not actually being sold. This set the precedent for the famed Lend-Lease Act of the next war.
In Roosevelt’s Navy, author James Tertius de Kay provides a useful insight into the formation of FDR’s thinking about naval and political power, and how his tenure as Assistant Secretary of the Navy prepared him for the great conflict of his presidency.

 

Marc G. De Santis

Littoral Combat Ship a Literal Mess

The Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) was meant to be a small and inexpensive naval vessel able to operate close to enemy shores. It was meant to do things that would otherwise imperil a more expensive destroyer. In an earlier post, I questioned why we were building ships that were undeniably weaker than destroyers and yet expecting them to go close to enemy coastlines. Unfortunately, it looks like the LCS is an expensive flop. This Time article says that it is underarmed, not survivable in a hostile environment (isn’t that important for a warship?), and costs two times more than originally planned.

One thing about the Pentagon is that, while it almost always overpays for its equipment, it usually ensures that it has the best stuff on the block. The F-22 fighter jet may also be a super-expensive near-flop, but when it works, it is the most capable warplane ever built. The LCS, on the other hand, which is actually two separate classes of ship, neither of which appear to be worth anything, is less heavily armed than other comparably-sized foreign vessels. The USS Freedom, the lead ship of the Freedom-class LCS, has developed numerous cracks in its hull. That is not good in a boat meant to float in water. The USS Independence, the lead ship in the Independence-class LCS, has suffered from serious corrosion problems. Yet somehow, we are paying much more on each copy than other governments do on equivalent ships.  How does this happen?

Neither ship, apparently, is built to actual warship standards, only commercial grade standards. Both classes of ship have also suffered from quality control problems. Why is the Navy buying craft that are known to be weaker, less survivable, and more costly than any others that are similar to it? At root, it may be that too much money fails to to focus the mind, and that perhaps the Navy does not fear enough the very real possibility that it will be stuck with a large complement of substandard warships.

The U.S. Navy has lately shot back over the Time critique of the LCS found on the Time website last week.   Here is the response of an official U.S Navy spokesman taking on the points made in the first article .  From this response, it appears that the ships are now being built to a higher-than-commercial standard.  Originally, however, it had not been planned to build the LCS this way.  Read both of them and be then decide whether the case for the LCS is still viable.

My primary question is why U.S. equipment always seems to cost so much more than the equivalent item in foreign inventories.  If it is a matter of consistently pushing the technological envelope, then I can understand that.  But if it is because of wasteful spending practices, which is a known and longstanding problem for the Pentagon, then a serious and thoroughgoing revision of American procurement practices is needed.